Across so any number of models of mathematics and of engineering, and any number of kinds of institutions and of definitions of culture, there may be a diversity of views discovered about any single topical domain. In a context of electrical engineering – as of the design and analysis of physical systems applying properties of electrodynamic systems, viz a viz models of atomic electron structure and electromagnetic properties of materials, if not also properties of light at varying frequencies in electromagnetic spectra, such as may be reified with reproducible calculations and with measurments of electrical current and voltage, electromagnetic field density, and luminosity – thus, broadly in a context of electrical engineering, perhaps the number of views about material of the domain may be at least as diverse as the number of theories and proofs comprising a presentation of the domain, as in any single presentation principally of the material sciences and corresponding mathematics as yet defined in the state of the art. Philosophically, it may seem that the student of the electrical sciences may thus be hard pressed – if not all to a metaphor of a grape or an olive, perhaps then to a metaphor of a school of geology – hard pressed, as though, to develop any singular, cogent, and consistently reproducible view of any number of principal theories comprising the state of the art.
If one is to depart from the corpus of materially proven theory, whether to disembark as to a foggy domain of the branding of commercial products or towards any perhaps more imaginative ends, one may then be pressed with the ironic task of proving a conjectural thesis about a materially well proven body of work – as though to depart from the body of scientific literature so far as extends of well-proven theory, if as though a conjectural thesis of identity would be sufficient as a premise for material work. Perhaps it may be conjectured, thence, as though the very essence of scientific theory was itself a manifestation of any manner of a shadowy agenda of an unknown agency, and the whole of scientific practice relegated thence to a principally superstitous, if not crude misappropriation of its material nature. If a statement of conjecture, then, would be mistaken for a scientific thesis, itself, and the conjecture depart from material proof, it may be much to the consternation of anyone endeavoring to apply the conjecture – if not all to the loss of the works developed and extended of the material sciences. If, moreover, the conjecture would become an insitutionally propgated thing, then the instituion of its propgation would itself begin acting – whether wittingly or not – as contrary to the very nature of the material sciences.
Perhaps, philosphical conjecture may find a role somewhere in a process of material proof, but surely such a role may not be located in or among the “End products” of any scientific procedure. Conjecture – however much a product of any manner of knowledge, but in any ways as a result of imagination, of a sense of philosophical creativity – conjecture may find a role as procedurally before hypothesis, thence to the more of a scientific method. If abandoned before hypothesis, however it may be to a sense of novelty, a conjecture may be of as much use as the echo of a tin pan tossed around in the winds of an incidental phenomenology. By contrast, a well proven scientific knowledge may be given to a metaphor of a carefully engineered structure, none overmuch subjected to any shocking insult of its principal foundations.
Departing from such a metaphor of material structures and incidental conjectures, thence again to address the principal foundations of scientific theory, a question may be developed as to how any manner of scientific theory may be most effectively presented, once thoroughly developed. In a short survey of the historic foundations of conetmporary academia, it may be observed: That every scientific theory that has ever occurred and been subsequently adopted as a contribution to the development of the state of the art has been accompanied, correspondingly, with a narrative description of the discovery – such that the description may serve as to present the discovery, as in a manner of a frame of the state of the art at the time of the discovery, and such as may serve to describe the discovery in itself. Broadly, the cynical assertion that, “There is nothing new under the sun,” it makes an odd shadow to the very nature of scientific provenance, whereof every “New” discovery must extend, completely, extending principally of previous discoveries, if it does not only extend of an accidental conjecture.
If for an absence of notable theatre, science might be mistaken as though it was of no great importance – as science being developed materially beside any of the many novelties produced of contempoary commerce – again, the principal foundations of science would remain unchanged, despite such unfair misapprehension.
Thus, but if science may be misapprehended as though it was not all of the resolute foundation of knowledge that knowledge develops, perhaps it may be thought instead to represent merely an object competing for popular attention in all of a material world as may be principally divorced from its material foundations? Perhaps there may be any manner of ideology to which, science may be only superficially observed as if it was no more meaningful than a box of rocks on a shelf? The conjectural adventures of a material cosmos may be many, but it is not without a material compass that human society has developed so far as to the present day.
Who, then, shall define what is the meaning of science? Shall it be relegated, as if, merely to the set of intellectual properties of any chiefly commercial institution? Shall it be, either, marginalized as if exclusively to the material displays of a museum of natural history? Shall it not be understood as it being of the foundations of knowledge, itself, in a principally real cosmos?
Hardpan Media 